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be followed in a situation where the escrow-grantee was not permitted
to occupy the premises.
Although some question might be raised as to whether a judgment
creditor is a bona fide purchaser, he has been treated as such in Rath-
mell v. Shirey, 6o Ohio St. 187 (1899), and in Crooks v. Crooks,
34 Ohio St. 61o (1878).
JOHN W. TANNER.
EQUITY
JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO RELIEVE ONE CONVICTED OF A
CRIME ON PERJURED TESTIMONY WHERE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS BARS LEGAL RELIEF
The plaintiff was convicted on perjured testimony of the crime of
assault to rape. Ohio Gen. Code. Sec. 13449-2 provides that a motion
for a new trial on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 12o
days following the rendering of the verdict. This statute had run when
the plaintiff discovered new facts showing that his conviction was on
perjured testimony. Relief was sought in equity to vacate the judgment
and to secure a new trial. A demurrer to the bill was overruled and
judgment entered for the plaintiff. Error was prosecuted to the Court of
Appeals and the ruling of the trial court reversed. To grant the relief
prayed for would be overruling the expressed intent of the legislature,
and 'while one maxim of equity recites that it will not suffer a wrong
to be without a remedy, another states that equity follows the law."
State v. Vaughn, 21 Ohio L. Abst. 585 (1936).
The court had a hard problem before it but not one entirely dis-
similar from that which equity was faced with in working out the
doctrine of part performance to remove the bar of the Statute of
Frauds, Butcher v. Stapely, I Vein. 363 (1685). Probably the first
case advancing fraud as the rationale of this doctrine was Mullet v. Half-
pcnny, Prec. Ch. 404 (1699). Equity from that time on has given re-
lief in certain types of cases notwithstanding the expressed legislative
intent, and in this state even applies the equity doctrine to law cases.
liVlbur v. Paine, I Ohio 251 (1824), O'Hara v. O'Hara, i6 Ohio
C.C. 367, 9 Ohio C.D. 293 (1898), Hodges v. Ettinger, 127 Ohio
State 460.
Similarly, the problem of the Statute of Limitation arose early in
cquity, and the general rule was laid down that equity follows the
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statute by analogy only. Robinson v. Fife, 3 Ohio State 551 (1854),
Glass v. Courtright 14 Ohio N.P. (NS) 273, 23 Ohio Dec. 253, 58
Bull. 165 (1913). A statute barring a legal action does not neces-
sarily affect the general doctrines of equity or the principles upon which
relief is granted in particular cases, and often such statutes are avoided
in equity where to enforce them would be inequitable and unjust.
Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N.Y. 362 (1872), Russell v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 102 Ohio St. 248 (1921), Kelley v. Boetcher, 85 Fed. 55
(1898). It would seem that the court might have relied upon the above
analogies and granted the injunction against the enforcement of the
judgments secured by perjured testimony even though not discovered
until after the 12o day statute had elapsed.
The use of equitable maxims as an approach in the decision of a case
is of doubtful merit. There are numerous instances where, in deciding
specific questions, the broad generalizations in the maxims are ignored.
The maxim "equity abhors a multiplicity of suits," was not controlling
in Hale v. Allison, 188 U.S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244 (1902). In spite of
the maxim "that he who comes into equity must come in with clean
hands," equity intervened to protect a wrongdoer where the parties
were not in pari delicto. Coleman v. Coleman, 61 Pac. (2d) 441
(Arizona 1936), Mueller et ux v. Michels, 184 Wis. 324 (1924),
199 N.W. 38o, Ogden v. Straus Bldg. Corp., 187 Wis. 232 (1925),
202 N.W. 34. The rules of equity must necessarily be sufficiently elastic
to do equity in a given case. Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331, 104
Ad. 515, (1918).
The court points out in the principal case that it follows the policy of
not disturbing adjudications on the theory that there must be some end
to litigation. Michael v. American Nat. Bank, 84 Ohio St. 370 (1911 ).
Such a policy may be desirable, but the injustice that would be done here
to the victim of perjury is obviously a high price to pay for its main-
tenance.
Fraud was recognized as a ground for relief in the early develop-
ment of equity, although it was only applied in civil cases. However,
the analogy between the criminal and civil case is obvious when found
involved as in the case under discussion. Injunction Against Execution
of Grim. Judg., 23 Mich. L. Rev. 57 (1924).
There is a respectable minority authority giving relief in civil cases
where the judgment has been obtained on perjury testimony. The
Nebraska court in a bastardy proceeding held that the intentional pro-
duction of false testimony was such fraud as would entitle the convicted
to relief after he has exhausted all ordinary legal remedies. Munro v.
Callahan, 55 Neb. 75, 70 Am. St. Rep. 366, 75 N.W. II (1898).
Similar rulings have been made by other courts. Avocato v. Dell'Ara,
84 S.W. 443 (Texas 1904), El Reno Fire Ins. v. Sutton, 41 Okla.
297, 50 L.R.A. (NS) lO64, 137 Pac. 700 (1913), Boring v. Ott,
138 Wis. 260, i9 L.R.A. (NS) io8o, 1i9 N.W. 865 (1909)-
Equity when it takes jurisdiction in this type of case does not act on
the theory that the judgment is wrong but on the theory that new mat-
ter is discovered which for some just reason can't be taken to the law
court for its consideration, and the rights acquired in consequence of the
judgment cannot be retained in good conscience. Garland v. Rives
4 Rand. 282 (Va. 1826), Edenfield v. Sayre, 81 Fla. 367 (1921). 15.
Ruling Case Law p 725.
The general rule is that equity will not interfere in criminal pro-
ceedings or restrain authorities charged with the execution of the criminal
law because equity cannot restrain the people or the sovereign. In re
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888), 15
Ruling Case Law p. 725. There are, however, certain well recognized
exceptions to this general rule. Equity will interfere where; (I) prop-
erty rights are involved, Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 25
Sup. Ct. 18 (I904), Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (I907), Adams
v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 6x L. Ed. 1336; (2) irre-
parable injury will result, Shinkle v. City of Covington, 83 Ky. 420
(I885) or (3) a multiplicity of criminal suits will follow, Mobile v.
Orr, i81 Ala. 308 (1913). In these situations the mandate of the
equity court isn't directed to the law court but is directed to the parties
and if need be to the executive officers of the law. 15 Ruling Case Law
p. 726, Avocato v. Dell'Ara, supra, Burnside v. Wand, 170 Mo. 531,
71 S.V. 337, 62 L.R.A. 427 (1902). Therefore, although it is ad-
mitted that equity could not compel the law court to grant a new trial,
equity could restrain the officers from further pursuing the judgment.
A reason frequently given for equity refusing relief in cases like the
principal one is that executive clemency may be had. Weaver v. State,
120 Ohio St. 44 (1929), People v. San Franisco, 213 Pac. 945 (Cal.
1923), State v. Mohammad, 189 Cal. 429 (1922). The implication
from such objection is that adequate relief may be had elsewhere. The
adequacy of this relief may be questioned. A hearing before the pardon
board may be denied or the governor may refuse help. After all it is a
judicial matter and it seems evident that the court should grant relief.
There is need for some relief other than executive clemency. If the
court will not grant it and refuses to adopt the historic precedence of the
statute of frauds and statute of limitation cases, it is suggested that the
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legislature broaden the scope of Sec. 13449-2 by an amendment worded
similar to a Minnesota statute: "Any judgment obtained in a court of
record by means of perjury * * * may be set aside by the aggrieved
party in an action brought for that purpose within three years after dis-
covery of such perjury * *." Minnesota Gen. St. Sec. 9405.
H. A. HERBRUCK
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF BLOOD GROUP TESTS - FIRST
REPORTED CASE IN OHIO
The recent case in Bowling Green, Ohio, State ex rel Van Camp
v. Wellng, 6 Ohio OP. 371, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1936) is the first
reported case in this state recognizing the admissibility in evidence of
blood group tests to prove non-paternity in bastardy proceedings. This
raises once more the issue which has been previously discussed in a note
in I Ohio St. L.J. 47 (1935) and in an article by Harriet S. Hyman
and Lawrence H. Snyder, "The Use of Blood Tests for Disputed
Paternity in the Courts of Ohio," 2 Ohio St. L.J. 203 (1936). The
authors point out that it is only in the past few years that American
courts have begun to accept the admissibility in evidence of such tests.
The states of New York and Wisconsin have taken the lead in this
movement, having already passed legislation providing for the making
of such tests in appropriate circumstances. The article referred to con-
tains comment on ten unreported Ohio cases in which blood tests have
been used. The authors conclude that the fact that so many cases have
been referred to them is an indication of a progressive attitude towards
blood group tests on the part of the courts of Ohio.
The Welling case was a bastardy proceeding instituted by Verda
Van Camp. Defendant filed a motion for an order requiring the plain-
tiff and her child to submit to a blood test for the purpose of proving it
impossible that he could have been the child's parent. The court granted
the order as within the inherent power of the court in the exercise of its
sound discretion and stated that where execution of the order is properly
safeguarded it does not amount to an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise
of power. The court pointed out that the absence of statutory authority
is not conclusive of the question, and that the reliability of these tests is
now adequately established by scientific data. As to the last point, he
cited eminent authorities to the effect that such tests are conclusive as to
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